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[L. A. No. 21344.

In Bank.

Apr. 27, 1951.J

B. M. FREEDMAN, Appellant, v. THE RECTOR, WARDENS and VESTRYMEN OF ST. MATTHIAS PARISH OF LOS ANGELES (8 Religious Corporation),
Respondent.

)

[1J Contracts-Performarce-Breach-Repudiation.-Even if the
vendee, under the terms of the escrow instructions, had a
reasonable time to perform after he unconditionally repudiated
the contract, such repudiation, if acted upon by the vendor
before it was retracted, excuses performance on the vendor's
part and makes plaintiff's repudiation a total breach of the
contract.
[2] Specific Performance-Availability of Remedy.-A vendee was
not entitled to damages or to specific performance of a contract for the purchase of realty where his offer to purchase,
made after r~pudiating the contract, was subject to a condition
which he had 110 right to impose and hence did not constitute a
withdrawal of the earlier repudiation.
[3] Forfeitures - Relief Against.-Although Civ. Code, § 3275,
provides for relief from forfeiture only where the breach of
(2) See 23 Cal.Jur. 82; 49 Am.Jur. 82.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 246; [2] Specific Performance, § 5; [3] Forfeitures, § 16; [4] Damages, § 136; [5-7]
Damages, § 117; [8] Vendor alJd Purchaser, § 136; [9] Vendor and
Purchaser, § 127; [10] Damages, § 133.
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the one seeking relief was neither wilful, fraudulent, nor
grossly negligent, the damage provisions of such code, together
with the policy of the law against penalties and forfeitures,
prv 7 ide an alternative basis for relief independent of such
section.
.
[4) Damages-Punitive Damages.-To permit what are in effect
punitive damages merely because a party has partially performed his contract before his breach is inconsistent with Civ.
Code, § 3294, limiting the right to exemplary damages, and
§§ 1670, 1671, dealing with liquidated damages.
[6] ld.-Penalties.-A penalty need not take the form of a stipulated fixed sum.
[6] ld.-Penalties.-A penalty comprising a forfeiture without
regard to actual damage suffered is unenforceable, and cannot
reasonably be justified as punishment for one who wilfully
breaches his contract.
[7] ld.-Penalties.-The policy of the law against allowing exemplary damages for breach of contract is expressed in Civ.
Code, § 3294, and if a penalty were to be imposed for such
breach it should bear some rational relationship to its purpose; a penalty equal to the net benefits conferred by part
performance bears no such relationship.
[8] Vendor and Purchaser-Forfeiture of Purchaser's InterestRelief forom Forfeiture.-On a· vendee's default where denial
of restitution would result in imposition of punitive damages,
the court may invoke Civ. Code, §§ 3275, 3294, 3369, which
respectively provide for relief from forfeiture, for exemplary
damages, and that relief will not be granted to enforce a
penalty or forfeiture.
[9) ld.-Forfeiture of Purchaser's Interest.-A contract provision
for retention of the down payment after default of a purchaser
of real property is presumptively valid, where the down payment is reasonable.
[10] Damages-Liquidated Damages-Real Estate Transactions.A contract provision allowing the seller of real property to
retain the down payment on the purchaser's default will not
be enforced as one for liquidated damages, where it is not impracticable or extremely difficult to fix actual damages. ( Civ.
Code, §§ 1670,1671.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. George Francis, Judge.· Reversed in part
and affirmed in part.
[3] See 12 Oal.Jur. 639.
[4] See 8 Oa1.Jur. 861; 15 Am.Jm. 698.
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council
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Action for specific performance of contract to sell real
property or for damages. Judgment for defendant reversed
insofar as it denied plaintiff restitution of any part of his down
payment, with directions to retry issue of amount thereof to
which he was entitled; affirmed in all other respects.
Blase A. Bonpane and L. H. Phillips for Appellant.
Steiner A. Larsen for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-On October 8, 1947, plaintiff signed a deposit agreement with Clarence Urban, a real estate broker,
for the purchase of two lots owned by defendant. He paid
$2,000 down and agreed to pay the balance of $16,000 into
escrow within 30 days. Both parties signed the escrow instructions a few days later. Although the deposit agreement
was ambiguous with respect to title requirements, the escrow
instructions provided that the property should be- free of
encumbrances except "covenants, conditions, restrictions,
reservations, rights, rights of way, (and] easements . . . now
of record." There was evidence that at the time plaintiff
signed the escrow instructions he was informed of all covenants and easements affecting the property, but he took the
position thereafter that he was under no obligation to purchase
the property until the title had been cleared. On November
20th the escrow agent informed plaintiff that the title was
clear except for an easement held by the water and power
department across the rear 5 feet of one of the lots. This
easement was abandoned the following April. On November
28th plaintiff wrote· defendant and the escrow agent repudiating the contract and demanding the return of his deposit.
He stated that the property had been misrepresented to him
and that defendant had failed to clear the title as required
by the contract. On December 19th plaintiff wrote defendant
that he would take title and pay the balance of the purchase
price as soon as the easement had been cleared. Defendant.
however, on December 27th cancelled the escrow and thereafter sold the property to a third party for $20,000. Early in
January plaintiff indicated his willingness to purchase the
property and shortly thereafter brought this suit for specific
performance. The trial court entered judgment for defendant
and plaintiff appeals.
[1] Plaintiff's main contention is that the contract was still
in eife('t when he sought to perform in January after defendant
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had cancelled the escrow and arranged for the sale of the
property to a third party. He bases this contention on the
theory that time was not of the essence of the contract and
that therefore defendant could not terminate his rights under
it without giving him notice to perform within a reasonable
time after the closing date, November 10th, fixed in the
escrow instructions. This contention overlooks the fact, however, that plaintiff unconditionally repudiated the contract
by his letters of November 28th. Even if it is assumed that
under the terms of the escrow instructions plaintiff bad a
reasonable time to perform after November 28th, his repudiation on that date if acted upon by defendant before it was
retracted, would excuse performance on defendant's part and
make plaintiff's repudiation a total breach of contract. (Gold
Min. & Water Co. v. Swinerton, 23 Ca1.2d 19, 29 [142 P.2d
22] ; see, Restatement, Contracts, §§ 280, 318, 319; Civ. Code,
§ 1440.)
[2] Although plaintiff made various oral proposals to continue with the purchase on terms other than those provided
in the contract, he did not unconditionally withdraw his repudiation until after defendant, in reliance thereon, had sold
the property to another. Plaintiff's letter of December 19th
expressed
Willingness to perform the contract only after the
I
easement held by the water and power department had been
abandoned. The escrow instructions provided, however, that
the title should be subject to easements of record. There was
evidence that plaintiff read the instructions and was informed
of the easement at the time he signed them. Since his letter
of December 19th contained a condition with respect to the
clearance of the easement that he had no right to impose,
it did not constitute a withdrawal of the earlier repudiation.
(Steelduet v. Henger-Seltzer Co., 26 Ca1.2d 634, 646 [160 I
P.2d 804] ; Alderson v. Houston, 154 Cal. 1, 14 [96 P. 884J.) .
Accordingly, the jl1dgment must be affirmed insofar as it
denies plaintift' specllk p",rformance or damages for breach
of contract.
The question remains whether plaintift' is entitled to the
return of any part of his down payment. Since defendant
resold the property for $2,000 more than plaintiff had agreed
to pay for it, it is clear that defendant suffered no damage
as a result of plaintift"s breach. If defendant is allowed tc
retain the amount of the down payment in excess of its expense:
in connection with the contract it will be enriched and plaintif
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will suffer a penalty in excess of any damages he caused.
Under our recent holdings in Barkis v. Scott, 34 Ca1.2d 116
[208 P.2d 367], and Baffa v. John.~on, 35 Cal.2d 36 [216 P.2d
13), plaintiff could recover that excess under section 3275 of
the Civil Code, if his breach was neither wilful, fraudulent.
nor grossly negligent. The trial court found, however, on
substantial evidence, that plaintiff's breach was wilful. It
is necessary to consider, therefore, the question left open in
the Baffa case, namely, whether a vendee under such circumstances may recover the excess of his part payment over the
damage he caused the vendor.
[3] As was pointed out in the Baffa case, if the right to
restitution rests solely on the provisions of section 3275, a
vendee who has been guilty of a wilful default must be denied
relief. We have concluded, however, that the damage provisions of the Civil Code, together with the policy of the law
against penalties and forfeitures provide an alternative basis
..for relief independent of section 3275.
" Few questions in the law have given rise to more discussion
and difference of opinion than that concerning the right of one
who bas materially broken his contract without legal excuse
to recover for such benefits as he may have conferred on the
other party by part performance. . . . A satisfactory solution is not easy, for two fundamental legal policies seem here
to come in conflict. On the one hand, it seems a violation of
the terms of a contract to allow a plaintiff in default to recover
-to allow a party to stop when he pleast's and sell his part
performance at a value fixed by the jury to the defendant who
has agreed only to pay for full performance. On the other
hand, to deny recovery often gives the defendant more than fair
compensation for the injury he has sustained and imposes a
forfeiture on the plaintiff. The mores of the time and place
will oftf'n determine which policy will be followed. But the
second of these opposing policies has steadily increased in favor
in recent years." (5 Williston on Contracts [rev. ed.] § 1473,
p.4118.)
In adopting a rule allowing restitution to the defaulting
vendee the Supreme Court of Utah stated:
"The vital question to be determined is: What is the
correct measure of damages in a case of this kind f Shall
we apply the rule of compensatory demages, or is it a case in
which punitive damages should be allowed' Upon what principle can punitive damages or damages in excess of compensa-
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tion for the injury done be justified in the case at bar 7 These
are questions that appeal both to the judgment and conscience
of the court. . . .
"The rule contended for by respondent, carried to its logical sequence, would forfeit every dollar paid by appellant and
still leave respondent in possession of the land even if appellants had paid the last installment but one, and then defaulted.
In answer to this, it may be said that such is not the cas~ at bar.
But where are we going to draw the linef" (Malmberg v.
Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 340, 345 [218 P. 975]; see, also. McCormick on Damages, § 153, p. 616; Corbin, The Right of a
Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Instalments Paid, 40
Yale L. J.1013.)
The failure of courts adopting a contrary viewpoint to
recognize that they are permitting unjustifiable penalties for
breach of contract has led to the comment that "The law,
while looking with righteous abhorrence on forfeitures. and
washing its hands of their enforcement, after the manner of
Pontius Pilate, yet has been reluctant to intervene with affirmative relief or to formulate any consistent principle condemning the validity of cut-throat provisions which in their essence
involve forfeitures. Although the law will not assist in the
vivisection of! the victim, it will often permit the creditor
to keep his pound of flesh if he can carve it for himself."
(Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 Minn.L.
Rev. 329, 341.)
[4] To permit what are in effect punitive damages merely
because a party has partially performed his contract before
his breach is inconsistent both with section 32941 of the Civil
Code limiting the right to exemplary damages and sections
16702 and 16718 dealing with liquidated damages. [6, 6] "A
penalty need not take the form of a stipulated fixed sum; any

"'In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from
contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the aetual dam·
ages, may reeover damages for the sake of example and by way of
punishing the defendant."
"'Every contract by which the amount of damage to be paid, or
other compensation to be made, for a breaeh of an obligation, is deter·
mined in antieipation thereof, is to that extent void, exeept as expressly
provided in the next. section."
I" The parties toa contraet may agree therein upon an amount which
shall be ore!lumed to be the amount of damage sustained by a breaeh
thereof, when, from the nature of the case, it would be impraeticable
or extremely diffieult to fix the aetual damage."

I
!
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proVlsIOn by which money or proptrty would be forfeited
without regard to the actual damage suffered would be an
unenforceable penalty." (Ebbert v. Mercantile Trust Co.,
213 Cal. 496, 499 [2 P.2d 776].) Such penalties cannot
reasonably be justified as punishment for one who wilfully
breaches his contract. [7] Not only does section 3294 of the
Civil Code express the policy of the law against the allowance
of exemplary damages for breach of contract regardless of
the nature of the breach (Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Ca1.2d 480,486
[196 P.2d 915]), but if a penalty were to be imposed it should
bear some rational relationship to its purpose. A penalty
equal to the net benefits conferred by part performance bears
no such relationship. It not only fails to take into consideration the degree of culpability, but its severity increases as the
seriousness of the breach decreases. Thus a vendee who
breaches bis eon tract before he has benefited the vendor by
part performance suffers no penalty, whereas one who has
almost completely performed his contract suffers the maximum
penalty.
Moreover, to deny the remedy ot restitution because a breach
is wilful would create an anomolous situation when considered
with section 3369 of the Civil Code. That section provides that
"Neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted to
enforce a penalty or forfeiture in any case . . .• " and precludes the court from quieting the vendor's title unless he
refunds the excess of the part payments over the damage
caused by the vendee's breach. (Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Cal.2d
36,39 [216 P.2d 13] ; Barki.~ v. Scott, 34 Ca1.2d 116, 121 [208
P.2d 367], and cases cited.) Unless the same rule is adopted
when the vendee seeks restitution, the rights of the parties
under identical fact situations will turn on the chance of which
one first seeks the aid of the court.
[8] In Glock v. Howard & Wt7son Colony Co., 123 Cal.
1 [55 P. 713, 69 Am.St.Rep. 17, 43 L.R.A. 199], the court
stated that on the vendee's default the vendor could stand
on his contract and retain both the land and any payments
that had been made. That statement was made without reference to sections 3275, 3294, and 3369 of the Civil Code. It
is probable that these code sections were not invoked in the
Glock case and similar cases because the vendee was unable to
prove that the vendor's retention of both the land and payments would result in the imposition of punitive damages.
(See Barkisv. Scott, supra, 34 Cal.2d 116, 121.) In the present
case, however, denial of restitution would result in the imposi-
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tion of punitive damagcN, and the foregoing sections may
therefore be invoked.
The provision of the contract providing that on plaintiff's
default defendant could retain the down payment cannot be
enforced as a valid clause providing for liquidated damages.
[9, 10] Although such a provision in a contract for the sale of
real property is presumptively valid, if the down payment is
reasonable in amount (Wright v. Rodgers, 198 Cal. 137, 142143 [243 P. 866] ; Civ. Code, § 3387), when as in this case the
evidence establishes that it would not "be impracticable or
extremely difficult to fix the actual damages" (Civ. Code,
§ 1671), such a provision may not be enforced as one for
liquidated damages. (Civ. Code, § 1670; Wright v. Rodgers,
supra, 198 Cal. 137, 144; see, also, Petrovich v. City of Arcadia,
36 Cal.2d 78, 85 [222 P .2d 231].)
Since a commission of $900 was retained by the broker from
the down payment it is clear that defendant received from
plaintiff at most $1,100. Defendant contends, however, that
there were other expenses incurred in connection with the
escrow that reduced the amount of the down payment received.
Since the trial court erroneously concluded that plaintiff could
recover no part of his down payment, no finding was made as
to the fraction that accrued to the net benefit of defendant.
Accordingly, a new trial limited to that issue is appropriate.
(See, Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal.2d 791, 801
[197 P.2d 713].)
The judgment is reversed insofar as it denies plaintiff restitution of any part of his down payment and the trial court
is directed to retry the issue of the amount thereof to which he
is entitled. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
Each party is to bear his own costs on this appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Spence,
J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 24,
1951. Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.

